My primary research focus is moral and political philosophy. I wrote my PhD thesis about demandingness objections in ethics.
If (for some reason) you want it, you can find my CV here.
Recent publications:
‘Miller’s Tale: Why The ‘Sympathy Principle’ is Inadequate’ (Kriterion)
Abstract: In the aftermath of Peter Singer’s ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, the argument he put forward received significant criticism, largely on the grounds that it demanded too much of moral agents. Several attempts have been made since to formulate moral principles that adequately express the stringency of our duties of beneficence. Richard Miller proposed one such option, which has several advantages over Singer’s principle. In particular, because it concerns our dispositions rather than operating over every possible occasion for beneficence, it avoids problems of iterative demands. However, I argue that Miller’s principle is inadequate, because 1) it seems too weak, 2) it appears to be ambiguous, and 3) it can give unduly harsh verdicts on unlucky moral agents.
‘Satisficing Consequentialism Still Doesn’t Satisfy‘, (Utilitas)
Abstract: Satisficing consequentialism is an unpopular theory. Because it permits gratuitous sub-optimal behaviour, it strikes many as wildly implausible. It has been widely rejected as a tenable moral theory for more than twenty years. In this article, I rehearse the arguments behind this unpopularity, before examining an attempt to redeem satisficing. Richard Yetter Chappell has recently defended a form of ‘effort satisficing consequentialism’. By incorporating an ‘effort ceiling’ – a limit on the amount of willpower a situation requires – and requiring that agents produce at least as much good as they could given how much effort they are exerting, Chappell avoids the obvious objections. However, I demonstrate that the revised theory is susceptible to a different objection, and that the resulting view requires that any supererogatory behaviour must be efficient, which fails to match typical moral verdicts.
‘Just Judge: The Jury on Trial’, (American Philospihcal Quarterly)
In this paper, I consider arguments in favour of jury trials. While I find these generally persuasive, I argue that there can be cases where juries not fit for purpose. In those cases, I argue that they should be replaced by judge-only trials. In doing so, I propose a framework for determining whether a type of case is unsuitable for jury trials. Partly in response to low conviction rates, there have been recent suggestions that rape trials should be conducted without juries. I suggest that there is strong evidence that these offences qualify under the criteria I have described. As a result, I argue that judge-only trials should be adopted for trying rape cases.
Some works in progress or under submission (get in touch if you’d like a draft copy):
‘Why Satisficers Still Get Away with Murder’ (under review)
Abstract: Recently, a few attempts have been made to rehabilitate satisficing consequentialism. One strategy, initially shunned by Tim Mulgan, is to suggest that what agents must satisfice – what they must ensure there is enough of – is effort, or willpower, rather than the value of the consequences. The effort satisficer is able to avoid some of the problem cases usually deemed fatal to the view. Richard Yetter Chappell has proposed a version of effort satisficing that not only avoids those problem cases, but has some independent plausibility. In this paper, I argue that some verdicts it delivers are too permissive. Revising a problem for the traditional outcome satisficer, I argue that Chappell’s willpower satisficing, and more generally, any effort satisficer, must implausibly condone murder in many cases. This seems like a bigger issue for any attempts at rehabilitating satisficing consequentialism in this way. I note some ways an effort satisficer might attempt to revise the account to avoid these problems, but argue that none of these can succeed.
‘Difficulty and Demandingness’
Abstract: Demandingness objections to moral theories have become commonplace. But what makes a theory too demanding? What explains why it is permissible for an agent not to perform an action which they might have most moral reason to perform? A standard answer is that the theory asks too much of them. However, understood in terms of imposing too high a cost, the objection fails, for reasons given by David Sobel. One recent suggestion is that it would be extremely difficult for an agent to perform these actions. I make the case for this position, but ultimately reject it, arguing that difficulty is only an excuse condition. I provide two arguments for this: the first based on a proposed symmetry with understanding legal excuses and the second based on moral phenomenology.
‘The Specification Problem for Rule-Consequentialism’
Abstract: Brad Hooker’s rule-consequentialism is able to avoid many of the stock objections that have historically been levelled against rule-consequentialism. However, in this talk, I argue that Hooker has a problem with specificity. Furthermore, the obvious candidates for how we might properly specify the account seem to open the position for serious problems. While there may be a principled version of the account that is defensible, this specificity problem seems to warrant serious attention from any consequentialists who find Hooker’s view appealing.
Joe Slater: A Rantspace 